



COMMERZBANK



Business Email Crime & Social Engineering

Payments Fraud Prevention, Frankfurt/Main

Cyber crime against companies starts directly with employees



Why hackers tend to target employees (rather than managers):

- Different products for electronic banking
- Nationally bigger differences in the technologies and authorisation media used
- The payment processing products used in Germany have a high level of technical security.

Conclusion

- Fraud scenarios practised abroad became widespread in the German-speaking world in 2015.
- Fraudsters target their attacks at employees within a company to ...

01 Extortion

... ultimately extort them or the company.

02 Payments

... get them to process payments that appear to be legal.

03 Access

... gain access to the employee's work computer to process the payment themselves, e.g. via remote access.



Fraud scenarios




Agenda

Fraud scenario: remote access tool



Fraud with legitimate remote maintenance software

- In retail banking, fraud is often committed using a (purported) Microsoft technician call.
- For companies, information about the firm is gathered in advance to prepare.
- Later someone claiming to be a bank employee calls the employee at the company. Under a pretence, the employee is urged to accept technical support (for example) for a necessary update of the payments system.
- The employee installs a remote access tool (using normally legitimate support software) as instructed by the caller and the fraudster uses the employee to gain access to their work computer.
- The employee is instructed to enter credentials into special and/or unusual fields. That enables the fraudster to read passwords. The access that has been gained and the credentials are used to authorise payments.
- Later, online banking appears to be unavailable because a manual update is being run. In reality, the credentials have been changed by the fraudster in order to take control of your account away from you.



TIP: If you have requested technical support and you receive a call from the person you expected, it is unlikely to be fraud. If someone pushes software on you and tries to get you to believe there are problems you do not see, it is probably fraud.



Fraud scenario: fake payment

A demand is made for goods to be delivered, but the payment is faked.

- Arrangements are made for a transaction and a partial payment or advance payment is agreed.
- The goods are produced and prepared for the client. The deposit is made as it should be.
- Shortly before the delivery date, the recipient sends an allegedly genuine proof of payment, account statement or even a supposed SWIFT confirmation from their bank saying payment has been made.
- The goods are sent.
- Later it turns out to have been a front company (shell company).
- The payment confirmations were fabricated. The money never arrives. The ordering party's alleged account usually does not even exist.

Business & Corporation Banking
International Money Transfer application

Please complete using CAPITAL letters – help is overleaf

1 The service you require Euro GBP Other

2 Your personal details

Full name / Business and address

Name: SANCTUARY HOUSING ASSOCIATION
Address: CHAMBER COURT, CASTLE STREET, WORCESTER, WR1 3ZQ

3 Amount and currency of payment

Amount: 66,268.37
Currency: EURO

4 Recipient customer (beneficiary) details

Beneficiary customer's account number: DE62 5704 0044
Beneficiary customer's bank details: COMMERCZBANK KOBLENZ

5 Your agreement with us

NatWest
50987856
Commercial business Banking
13 MARKET PLACE, READING RG1 2EP

IRREVOCABLE INTERNATIONAL BANK TRANSFER

CUSTOMER INFORMATIONS

DATE: 14/06/2014
NAME: SANCTUARY HOUSING ASSOCIATION
ACCOUNT # : 60-88-80-83
SWIFT CODE: 608151
ORDER REFERENCE: 82816-F2607
REF: 206751

THE BENEFICIARY

BANK NAME: COMMERCZBANK KOBLENZ
BANK ADDRESS: GERMANY
BENEFICIARY: [REDACTED]
IBAN: DE62 5704 0044
SWIFT CODE: COMMDE33XXX
CURRENCY: EURO
TRANSFER AMOUNT: EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY FIVE AND SEVENTY CENTS ONLY

CURRENCY: AMOUNT
GBP: 66,268.37
EUR: 66,268.36
EXCHANGE RATE: 0.794839
TRANSFER AT VALUE DATE: 14/06/2014

DETAILS OF CHARGES
DNT 150 4.000
TAX 3.000
STAT 0
EMT FEE 25.000
CODING 5.000

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF:
COMMERCZBANK AG
FRANKFURT, GERMANY

CONFIDENTIAL MEMO

DATE: MAY 23, 2016
REF: COBA-CA0599102581916

POF ACCOUNT NUMBER: 690-8567020
SELLER'S REF. CODE: [REDACTED]
PRINCIPAL SELLER: MRS. SANDY GOYAL
INDIAN PASSPORT NUMBER Z2168193
BANK OPERATIONS: COMMERCZBANK AG – FRANKFURT, GERMANY

PRINCIPAL BUYER: [REDACTED]
ISSUER OF CERTIFICATE: COMMERCZBANK AG – FRANKFURT, GERMANY

SCREENING PROCEDURES:

1. ENTER THE ACCESS CODE FOR [REDACTED]
2. ENTER THE SECURITY CODE [REDACTED]
3. GO TO RELATED CODE [REDACTED]
4. ENTER THE NET CODE [REDACTED]
5. ENTER THE FOLLOWING ACCESS CODE: PRE90129
CUSIP: [REDACTED]
SWIFT CODE: COMMDE33
SCREENING CODE: 6901542018
ISIN: 000451172
COMMAND CODE: 821752
DTC: 08280184L-PG 8912
UNIT: [REDACTED]
6. FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ON SCREEN AS APPROPRIATE FOR:
a. OPTION 1 TO BLOCK THE BANK INSTRUMENT CONCERNED
b. OPTION 2
c. OPTION 3
7. IF ANY OF THE AFORESAIDED OPTIONS IS NOT SELECTED, THE SAID BANK INSTRUMENT WILL GO OFF FROM THE SCREEN.

FOR AND ON BEHALF OF:
COMMERCZBANK AG
FRANKFURT, GERMANY

MARTIN ZIELKE
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

STEPHAN ENGELS
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



TIP: A transfer has a legal form that has a discharging effect when the amount is credited to the recipient's account. So check the alleged proof of payment for clues that it might be fake and put safeguards in place to protect international transactions with new business partners. Do internet research.



Fraud scenario: invoice fraud

A new take on invoice fraud is when an alleged boss wants the transfer or a lawyer insists on bills being paid.

- In one version, a final warning is sent to an accountant. A little later a lawyer for the company calls and requests payment. If requested, bogus invoices and orders are sent straight away.
- In another version, an accountant receives an alleged email forwarded from their boss requesting payment. An invoice and invented order history are attached.
- In current versions, the employee only receives a question from the manager about how much money is left in the account and whether an international transfer can still be executed today. Instructions are issued based on the response.
- Damages in individual cases run between EUR 10,000 and EUR 180,000.
- Pay attention to the legitimacy of the sender. The inbox overview does NOT list the sender.

Von: **hans.chef@firma.de**
An: **buchhalter@firma.de**
Cc:
Betreff: Bitte um dringende Erledigung!

Nachricht | RechnungRalfNeddermeyer | 127

Bitte um dringende Erledigung. Brauche hierzu keine Rückmeldung.

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2016 um 10:37:19 Uhr
Von: "Ralf Neddermeyer" <raif.neddermeyer@gmail.com>
An: "Hans Chef" <hans.chef@firma.de>
Betreff: Rechnung für Anzahlung Webentwicklung Firma

Sehr geehrter Herr **Chef**,

anbei erhalten sie wie telefonisch besprochen die Rechnung zur erste Montag, den 24. Oktober mit der Entwicklung anfangen können, bitte

Ich freue mich auf die Zusammenarbeit und hoffe bei unserer nächst

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Ralf Neddermeyer

Ralf Neddermeyer Webentwicklung
Ralf Neddermeyer
80803 München
11. Oktober 2016
D-94513 Schönberg

Rechnung

Rechnungs-Nr.	2016-10-155	Kunden-Nr. 116
1	Anzahlung Webentwicklung	9.850,00€

Gemäß § 19 UStG enthält der Rechnungsbetrag keine Umsatzsteuer.
Ich bitte den Betrag sofort auf das folgende Konto zu begleichen.

Kontoinhaber:
Ralf Neddermeyer
IBAN: DE57 [REDACTED]
BIC: FDD0DE33XXX



TIP: Educate your employees about this type of fraud. Invoices should not be paid without the proper process or order. Use the Outlook functions that signal whether a recipient is within your organisation or outside of it.

Fraud scenario: cheque overpayment



The cheque bounces. Your reverse transfer cannot be undone.

- **Traditional form:** Payment by cheque is requested when an order or booking is placed. The cheque is then issued in excess of the amount needed and the person requests that the "accidental" overpayment is transferred back to them.
- **New form:** Your company accepts an order. You request payment by transfer and provide your IBAN. That gives the fraudster your bank's address.
- An overpayment by cheque is sent directly to your bank with a fraudulent letter. The letter requests that the amount be credited to your account.
- Once the money is paid in, you have unexplained income.
- A little later, the fraudster's email arrives saying that their accounting department accidentally mixed up two transactions. They "transferred" you too much money, the amount of a different invoice.
- The fraudster knows that you only know the amount credited but never held the cheque in your hands. He requests that the difference be transferred back. The cheque is bogus and "bounces".

We are offering without engagement on basis of our general conditions of sale attached herewith respectively available upon request:

Item	Qty.	Description	unit price	total price
1	20 pieces	██████████ fixtures as per catalogue: 4 ██████████	897,00 ✓	17.940,00
Total value on basis EXW			EUR	17.940,00

Prices: Euro/pc., net-net, on basis EXW

Payment: permanent tsb BANK DRAFT
12 13 LR O'CONNELL STREET DUBLIN 1
Not to exceed € 86,662.00
99-06-58
DATE: 15/09/2016

Deliverytime:
Origin:
Validity:

PAY ██████████ KG ***** OR ORDER | € 86,662.00
Eighty Six Thousand Six Hundred and Sixty Two Euros only

067580
IBAN: 210607581

The Clearing House
At the Center of Banking Since 1853[®]
September 15, 2016

THE BRANCH MANAGER
COMMERZBANK AG
JUNGFERNSTIEG 22,
20354 HAMBURG, GERMANY

In respect to the agreement with the payee, BARCLAYS BANK PLC offers the enclosed payment.

DEPOSIT AGREEMENT AND INSTRUCTIONS		
BENEFICIARY(PAYEE)	AMOUNT	STATUS
██████████	€86,662.00	APPROVED




TIP: Check carefully if a credit is a cheque deposit. Depending on the country, a cheque can be cancelled for ten days at a minimum, sometimes months. We call you before depositing cheques from third parties. If you did not request a cheque deposit, contact your bank immediately.

Fraud scenario: payment diversion



When bank account details suddenly change

- It appears that your business partner is correcting the bank account details.
- It may be done directly via a genuine email in an invoice if your business partner's email system has been compromised.
- Falsified changes to bank account details in the name of an employee to redirect salary payments may also occur.
- Wrong bank account details may be received by email, fax or letter.
- If the change is made without reference to an invoice, it usually happens with companies when goods are delivered or services provided under framework agreements (mining, travel companies, chemicals, automotive suppliers, etc.).
- The scam is noticed only when the business partner issues a payment reminder. Time is often lost requesting that the fraudulent transfer be investigated.




TIP: Ensure your email communications are secure. Unencrypted email is like a postcard. Protect your master data, such as bank accounts and your business partners' delivery addresses. Require the people you are contracting with to do the same. Question any change, preferably using a different "channel" (e.g. call).



Fraud scenario: man in the middle (PD)

Somewhere in one of the email replies, the sender's name changes suddenly by only one or two characters.

- Business partners are arranging a deal and even ask each other some personal questions at the beginning. Then the order is made.
- You do not notice that other similar looking email addresses creep in as you communicate over time.
- Because the content is practically the same as the original and the chain of messages is there, no alarms are raised when the bank account details are changed when the invoice is generated.
- The bank account details in the invoice have been manipulated. The invoice is not unexpected, however, and had been approved.
- The scam is only noticed when your business partner sends a payment reminder or when the goods do not get to the party who paid for them.
- Time is often lost requesting that the fraudulent transfer be investigated.



TIP: Sichern Ensure your email communications are secure. Unencrypted email is like a postcard. Protect your master data such as bank accounts and your business partners' delivery addresses. Require the people you are contracting with to do the same. Question any change, preferably using a different "channel" (e.g. call).

Fraud scenario: CEO fraud (aka "boss scam")



The individual employee becomes the fraudster's drone.
Trust in the principal bank is exploited.

- Your company may be spied on months before the scam sometimes. Data is gathered from the internet, public registers, social media used for professional purposes and sometimes seemingly irrelevant calls.
- The employee receives an email or a call, allegedly from their boss. They are entrusted with a confidential financial matter and are told to contact an advisor/lawyer at a reputable law firm/consultancy.
- The confidentiality is repeatedly emphasised. Outstanding information is requested: accounts, balances, authorised parties.
- The employee later receives a transfer order that has already been signed.
- The employee makes the transfer, other "payments" are required. The fraudster calls until the scam is noticed or the money runs out.




TIP: Always also call us if there is ever a CEO fraud attempt, even if the employee spots the email. Educate people about this sort of fraud. Use the Outlook functions that show whether a recipient is within your organisation.

Fraud scenario: CEO fraud





- 01** The alleged boss entrusts the employee in strictest confidence with a task. They should provide a third party (lawyer, consultancy, law firm) with all the necessary information by email.
- 02** The employee is then contacted by the third party, skilfully assured and manipulated. The goal is to get further information (limits, authorisations, necessary signatures).
- 03** The employee is instructed to make payment; naturally with signatures that have already been provided that they had previously said were required (distributed signature). Throughout they are adeptly involved in the email exchange between the alleged boss and the third party.
- 04** The employee that we as the bank know and trust instructs us to make the payment with the requested urgency. Follow-up questions are generally not answered for confidentiality reasons.


Fraud scenario: CEO fraud



Fraudster



Employee 08



- 05 Problems are resolved with the alleged boss. Unauthorised signatures should now be authorised using the Commercial Register (for example).
- 06 They work with fake documents, identifications, certifications and BaFin documentation. The employee within the company is used to pressure the bank. The payment is supposedly urgent after all.
- 07 Requested assurances and confirmations are provided.
- 08 If the balance in the account is not sufficient to make the payment, the employee is sent to the bank to ask for an overdraft. A balancing payment is promised for the next day, and with money supposedly from the holding company or a subsidiary. If those do not exist, the fraudster is content to take smaller amounts too.
- 09 When the bank asks whether it could be fraudulent, the answer is no: "The payment is OK."

Even any questions from the internal compliance department within the company are brushed away with reference to the requested confidentiality.

Fraud scenario: extortion

Do you gain anything from disclosing the information?

Rule number 1: If something is free,
you are paying with your data.

- Possible scenario: An employee has information on Xing, for example, and someone using a false identity posing as a headhunter or consultant requests that they be added as a contact. By confirming the request, the employee discloses their network and data, assuming that they had not already made them available for all to see because of inadequate privacy settings.
- If the employee uses the same name in the social media they use privately, if they disclose private information there or accept friend requests from people they do not know personally and if they are possibly connected to their own children who in turn post where they play sports, then there is potential for blackmail.
- Other versions: spam blackmail emails claim to have accessed your laptop camera and threaten to release the recorded images if you do not...
- New social media threat: sextortion



Social Media

XING

LinkedIn

Facebook

Twitter

Fraud scenario: extortion trojans



The client is attacked using malware or a hack. The company's files are copied and encrypted.

- Prevention is the only cost-effective course. Invest in your IT security and IT surveillance!
- Sudden disaster scenario. The only things that help when a company is encrypted are Offsite-backups and offsite emergency plans.
- No more backups? The damage is often greater than the ransom. Pay? Will you get a key? Will the data be saved?
- Report the issue to your insurer if you have cyber insurance.
- The largest ransom demanded we are aware of in Bitcoin: EUR 240 million
- **We advise against paying!**
- Do not forget the GDPR! Anyone failing to report a relevant incident within 72 hours can be fined.
- We strongly recommend getting the police involved (central cyber crime desk of the criminal police force in each Federal state).
- Leave the work to IT forensics specialists. Internal IT departments often do not have the necessary skills and/or capacities to deal with the situation. Decryption after the fact is almost never possible.



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01 Secuso.org on YouTube (German)



This video is about pitfalls in handling emails. How do I distinguish between real and fake links and what do I need to look for? Secuso.org originated at Darmstadt University and has a number of such videos on the internet.

https://youtu.be/4xIU1IPJs_4

02 Fusion.net on YouTube (English)



This video shows a social hacker a reporter has asked to demonstrate how easy social hacking is. She is actually only supposed to find the reporter's email address but by the end she takes control of his entire mobile phone account using a simple trick that the hotline worker she phones is very happy to help with.

<https://youtu.be/lc7scxvKQOo>

03 Gravoc on YouTube (English)



An animated clip shows the typical key points to know in order to avoid social engineering. The attack usually comes via channels that people are not initially paying attention to.

<https://youtu.be/Vo1urF6S4u0>



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